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UTICA PACKING CO. V. BLOCK
781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986)
Agency replacement of Judicial Officer improper
decision rendered by replacement is voided
[Editor's Synopsis]
The Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. SS 601,
et seg. (1982), authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
suspend inspection services to a meat packer (thereby, in
effect, suspending the meat packer's ability to conduct
business) when, inter alia, a person responsibly connected
with the packing company has been convicted of a felony.
The Secretary may condition the suspension order, so as to
be applicable only until the responsible felon has severed
his employment.
The administrative review process used by the
Department of Agriculture ("USDA") is unusual in one respect. When the Secretary charges a meat packer with having
violated the act (as, for example, by employing a felon),
the company has a right to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in accordance with customary administrative practice. The hearing is controlled by the Administrative Procedure Act.
However, in a departure from the general model,
appeals from an ALJ's decision are not decided by the
Secretary of Agriculture. Rather, the Secretary has
appointed a "Judicial Officer" to review the decision of the
ALJ and issue a final agency order, which is then subject to
judicial review. In this respect, the Department of Agriculture resembles those agencies which utilize structurally
independent review boards, with one important difference.
The Judicial Officer has no tenure in that office. According to the government, the Judicial Officer serves at the
pleasure of the Secretary, and may be replaced at will.
Moreover, in Utica Packing, the Court of Appeals, by dictum,
appears to agree that such is the Secretary's general power.
One Fenster, President and part owner of Utica
Packing, was convicted of the felony of bribing a meat
inspector. Following a hearing, an ALJ ordered withdrawal
of meat inspection services unless Fenster divested himself
of his interest in Utica and withdrew from management. The
Judicial Officer affirmed and, noting that Fenster's crime
went to the heart of the meat inspection program, refused'to
consider any extraneous mitigating circumstances. The
District Court granted summary judgment to the USDA enforcing the Order. On further appeal, however, the Court of

Appeals reversed and remanded the case, directing the
Judicial Officer to consider evidence in mitigation of the
penalty imposed.
Upon remand, the Judicial Officer expressed strong
disagreement with the Court of Appeals, stating that "any
person who is convicted . . . of corruptly bribing a Federal

meat inspector is unfit to receive Federal inspection,
regardless of any mitigating circumstances". However, as
directed by the Court, he did review the mitigating evidence: ethnic slurs of Fenster by one of the inspectors,
Fenster's ill health, his desire to operate a clean plant,
etc. Stating that he would give no weight to this evidence
had it not been for the Court's direction, the Judicial
Officer concluded that "if any felon convicted

. . . of

bribing a meat inspector is fit to receive Federal meat
inspection", Fenster is. The Judicial Officer dismissed the
complaint.
Under the USDA rules, the agency had ten days to
apply to the Judicial Officer for reconsideration of the
decision. In the alternative, the agency could immediately
seek review in the District Court. USDA officials "violently
disagreed" with the decision of the Judicial Officer dismissing the complaint, and had little hope for reconsideration. Accordingly, for the admitted purpose of improving
their chances on reconsideration, the agency prosecutors
caused the Judicial Officer to be removed, and replaced by
the Secretary with another Judicial Officer. The second
Judicial Officer was a non-lawyer. Accordingly, to assist
him in reconsideration, he was assigned an attorney who
worked on the staff of one of the USDA employees who had
participated in the decision to replace the first Judicial
Officer. Neither the second Judicial Officer nor his
assigned attorney had any prior personal contact with the
case. A petition for reconsideration was presented to them
within ten days of the original Judicial Officer's decision
dismissing the complaint. The new Judicial Officer, on
reconsideration, ruled against Fenster and Utica. The
District Court again granted summary judgment to the agency.
The case then returned to the Court of Appeals. Chief Judge
Lively, speaking for the panel, said:

Utica and Fenster have presented a number of
arguments for reversal, two of which require our
consideration. In the first place, they contend that
the actions of USDA violated the Administrative

Procedure Act, particularly 5 U.S.C. S 554(d), which
provides in relevant part:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review
pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings.
The plaintiffs admit that Franke [the second Judicial
Officer] performed no investigative or prosecuting
They argue, however, that
functions in the Utica case.
the selection of Franke and Davis [Franke's staff
attorney] by officials who were involved in the prosecution of the case violated the prohibition against
prosecutors participating or advising in the decision
of the second Judicial Officer. The Secretary counters
that there was no violation of § 554(d) since neither
Franke nor Davis had prior contact with the Utica case
and no prosecutor or investigator participated as a
judge.
The second basis for reversal urged by the plaintiffs is that the procedures followed by USDA in this
case violated the due process guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment.
They assert that fundamental fairness was
sacrificed to gain a desired decision from a
hand-picked judge and that all appearance of fairness
was 'shattered'. The plaintiffs point out that Campbell [the first Judicial Officer] was a career employee
who was protected under the merit system and thus
immune to departmental pressures (though he had no
tenure in the position of Judicial Officer), whereas
Franke, a political appointee, had no job protection
In addition, they contend,
and could be fired at will.
the appointment of Davis, a subordinate of Kelly [an
Associate General Counsel of USDA], guaranteed that the
group who chose the 'option' of revocation and
redelegation would have strong influence over the
decision on reconsideration.
The Secretary responds that there is a presumption
of honesty and integrity on the part of responsible
officers and that the plaintiffs produced no evidence
He argues
of any improprieties by Franke or Davis.
that the supervision of agency adjudicators by
prosecutorial officers has been upheld and that

criminal cases involving blending of prosecutorial and
judicial functions are not controlling in administrative settings.
III.

A.
Neither the court nor the parties have found a
case with facts similar to those established by this
record. This may be because very few federal agencies
and departments have a position like the USDA Judicial
Officer. He acts as delegee of the Secretary who
appears to have total discretion in selecting and
appointing the person to fill the position. While
admitting that one of the reasons for removing Campbell
and appointing Franke was to improve the chances of
USDA on reconsideration, the Secretary asserts that the
primary reason was that Campbell so 'grossly misinterpreted' this court's decision ordering a remand that he
was incapable of exercising an objective review.
Reduced to its essence this is a claim that the Secretary's delegation can be withdrawn before reconsideration any time he disagrees with the Judicial Officer's
conclusions. Yet discovery in this case disclosed that
Judicial Officers had made hundreds of decisions since
1940, and none had ever had his delegation revoked on
this ground. If the Judicial Officer is to have
stature as an independent decision-maker, this argument
of the Secretary cannot be accepted.
B.
The actions of USDA in this case do not appear to
have violated APA S 554(d). The clear purpose of this
section is to separate the investigative and prosecutorial functions from the adjudicative function. Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41, 70 S.Ct. 445,
450, 94 L.Ed. 616, modified, 339 U.S. 908, 70 S.Ct.
564, 94 L.Ed. 1336 (1950). We do not accept the
Secretary's position that § 554(d) is to be read so
narrowly that it applies only to cases where the same
person acts as prosecutor or investigator and judge.
However, so far as this record shows neither Franke nor
Davis had any prior contact with the Utica case, and
there was no showing that anyone in USDA actually
influenced the decision on reconsideration. Nor was
there any showing that either Franke or Davis was
acquainted with ex parte information about the case.

By regulation USDA has specifically prohibited ex parte
communications between investigators or prosecutors and
the Judicial Officer.
(a) At no stage of the proceeding between
its institution and the issuance of the final
decision shall the Judge or Judicial Officer
discuss ex parte the merits of the proceeding with
any person who is connected with the proceeding in
an advocative or in an investigative capacity, or
with any representative of such person:
Provided,
That procedural matters shall not be included
within this limitation; and Provided further, That
the Judge or Judicial Officer may discuss the
merits of the case with such a person if all
parties to the proceeding, or their attorneys have
been given notice and an opportunity to participate. A memorandum of any such discussion shall
be included in the record.
7 CFR S 1.151(a).
Ip Grolier Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 615
F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980), the court stated the
intention of Congress in adopting § 554(d) as follows:
"We conclude that by forbidding adjudication
by persons 'engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions,' Congress intended to preclude from decisionmaking in a particular
case not only individuals with the title of
'investigator' or 'prosecutor', but all persons
who had, in that or a factually related case, been
involved with ex parte information, or who had
developed, by prior involvement with the case a
'will to win'.
The focus under § 554(d) is on the past involvement of the adjudicator.
Under the peculiar facts of
this case we include both Franke and Davis within the
term 'adjudicator' or 'judge' because of Franke's
obvious reliance on Davis in all matters legal.
In
order for § 554(d) to cause disqualification where the
adjudicator was not actually a prosecutor or investigator in the case or a factually related one, the person
challenging his right to adjudicate has the burden of
showing that some past involvement has acquainted him
with ex parte information or engendered in him an
unjudgelike 'will to win'.
Id. at 1221. Though the

Iredelegation' of Franke as Judicial Officer was
invalid for other reasons the plaintiffs did not make
this showing and we do not believe the move violated
the Administrative Procedure Act.
IV.
A.
The Secretary does not quarrel with the indisputable fact that Anglo-American law does not permit
anyone to be the judge of his own case. At least since
Lorde Coke's decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 114a
(C.P.1610), this has been the rule. The Secretary also
recognizes that Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct.
437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), established the principle
that it violates due process for a judge to have a
direct and substantial interest in the outcome of a
case before him. However, the Secretary argues that
these principles were not involved in the removal of
Campbell and the appointment of Franke, since Franke
was not a party and was not shown to have any interest
in the outcome of the case.
The Secretary places principal reliance on
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed.
1107 (1955), in arguing that the due process rights of
Fenster and Utica were not violated in the present
case. Marcello involved proceedings under § 242(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b). The Petitioner charged that the proceedings
violated due process because they failed to provide for
a fair and impartial hearing. The objection was that
the special inquiry officer who conducted the deportation proceedings was subject to the supervision and
control of officials in the Immigration Service charged
with investigative and prosecuting functions. Rejecting this claim, the court stated:
'The contention is without substance when considered against the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and against
the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in
exercising its particularly broad discretion in
immigration matters.'

Id. at 311, 75 S.Ct. at 762. Marcello appears to be
limited to immigration cases.
The Supreme Court affirmed in Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712
(1975), that the due process requirement of a fair
trial in a fair tribunal 'applies to administrative
agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts.'
(Citation omitted.)
Nevertheless, the Court distinguished cases where the probability of actual bias is
'too high to be consitutionally tolerable' from normal
administrative adjudication:
'The contention that the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in
administrative adjudication has a much more
difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same
individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if
the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.'
Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464.
B.

We believe this is a case where the plaintiffs
have shown the risk of unfairness to be 'intolerably
high.' Every disappointed litigant would doubtless
like to replace a judge who in the regular course of
his or her duties has decided a case against the
litigant and present a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration to a different judge of his own choosing. All notions of judicial impartiality would be
abandoned if such a procedure were permitted.
There is no guarantee of fairness when the one who
appoints a judge has the power to remove the judge
before the end of proceedings for rendering a decision
which displeases the appointer. Yet that is exactly
what occurred in this case. Campbell was appointed

Judicial Officer long before the Utica case arose, and
considered the case in the normal course of his duties.
When Campbell rendered a decision in the case with
which USDA 'violently disagreed,' officials of the
department unceremoniously removed him and presented a
petition for reconsideration to their handpicked
replacement.
It is of no consequence for due process purposes
that Fenster and Utica were unable to prove actual bias
on the part of Franke or Davis. The officials who made
the revocation and redelegation decision chose a
non-career employee with no background in law or
adjudication to replace Campbell. They assigned a
legal advisor to the new Judicial Officer who worked
under an official who was directly involved in prosecution of the Utica case. Such manipulation of a judicial or quasi-judicial, system cannot be permitted.
The due process clause guarantees as much. As the
court stated in D.C. Federation of Civil Ass'ns v.
Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1290, 31 L.Ed.2d 489
(1972):
'With regard to judicial decisionmaking, whether
by court or agency, the appearance of bias or
pressure may be no less objectionable than the
reality.'
V.
Nothing in this opinion should be perceived as
minimizing the seriousness of Fenster's criminal
activities. .

.

.

It is not certain that Campbell

properly construed this court's remand order in considering mitigating circumstances. However, that is not
the issue presently before us. Whether the Judicial
Officer was correct or incorrect in his application of
the law, the Secretary's efforts to change the result
by the methods described in this opinion cannot be
permitted to succeed.
The judgment of the district court is reversed,
and the case is remanded with directions to remand it
to the Secretary for re-entry of Judicial Officer
Campbell's order dismissing the complaint against Utica
and Fenster.

